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Introduction
International commercial law conventions (“transnational law”)
increasingly have become the legal device of choice regulating
international commercial transactions. These treaties contain
substantive provisions that define the legal entitlements of parties to
transactions within their scope. At the same time, they also mandate
how the treaty’s text is to be interpreted. In particular, international
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commercial law conventions require that uniformity be taken into
account in interpreting the text. United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) conventions, such as the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods (CISG), are the most prominent example of these
international commercial law conventions.1 At a minimum, an
international convention, once ratified, displaces domestic law to
the extent that domestic law is inconsistent with the convention’s
provisions. But the incorporation of international commercial law
conventions into domestic law has a further legal consequence. Its
incorporation adds a method of textual interpretation for
transnational law — “the uniformity directive”2 — to the methods
in force in domestic law for the interpretation of treaties. As a result,
the interpretation of transnational law texts relies on both generally
applicable methods of treaty interpretation and interpretive methods
specific to transnational instruments.

1 See U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), art.
7(1), Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3; U.N. Convention on Independent Guarantees and
Stand-By Letters of Credit, G.A Res. 50/48, art. 5, (Dec. 11, 1995); U.N. Convention on
Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, G.A. Res.
63/122, art. 2 (Sept. 23, 2009) [hereinafter the Rotterdam Rules]; U.N. Convention on the
Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts, G.A. Res. 60/21, art. 5
(Nov. 23, 2005); U.N. Convention on International Bills of Exchange and International
Promissory Notes, G.A. Res. 43/165, art. 4 (Feb. 28, 1989). For UNCITRAL Model Laws
containing the same mandate, see UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency,
art. 8 (1997); UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, G.A. Res.
61/33, art. 2A(1) (Dec. 4, 2006). For a soft law containing the uniformity directive, see
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, art. 1.6 (2016).
UNCITRAL was established in 1966 by the United Nations General Assembly.
Its mandate is to promote the harmonization and unification of international trade law “by
preparing and promoting the use and adoption of legislative and non-legislative
instruments.” See A Guide to UNCITRAL: Basic facts about the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law, 1 (2013). UNCITRAL uses special terminology
for the international instruments it produces. Products it calls “Conventions” are proposals
for multilateral treaties, which nation states join according to their domestic law for joining
multilateral treaties. “Model Laws” are templates offered for adoption by nation states
through whatever method they use to enact domestic law. Model Laws are not proposals
for treaties. See id. at 13–14. Throughout this paper, we refer to multilateral treaties that
have come into effect as “conventions.” To date, the CISG and the United Nations
Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts are in
effect as treaties. See UNCITRAL, Overview of the Status of UNCITRAL Conventions
and Model Laws (showing an overview status table).
2 See infra note 56 and accompanying text; cf. UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts, supra note 1, art. 1.6.
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We maintain that international commercial conventions, once
incorporated into domestic law, make legal interpretation more
difficult and its results less predictable. Textual interpretation of
transnational law is made more difficult not because transnational
law introduces substantive rules into a legal system that differ from
those of domestic law. Almost any incorporation of transnational
law into national law does this. Instead, transnational law makes its
interpretation more complex and less predictable because it
introduces an interpretive method that differs from the methods for
interpreting treaties generally.
The increased difficulty in
interpretation is exhibited in the tendency to rely on well-known
domestic law methods to interpret transnational law.
The argument of this paper that transnational law makes
interpretation more difficult consists of four claims: (1)
international commercial conventions become law when
incorporated into national law; (2) this both changes the content of
law in that legal system by displacing previously applicable
domestic law and adds a method for interpreting international
commercial conventions: the uniformity directive; (3) the
uniformity directive differs from the methods of interpretation
applicable to treaties generally; and (4) the interpretive methods
applicable to transnational law, including the uniformity directive,
are unstructured and leave courts without guidance in applying
them.
This paper is organized as follows. Part I describes the
connection between methods of textual interpretation and the nature
of law. Part II outlines the different approaches to textual
interpretation common among legal orders. It identifies the
interpretive methodology required by the law of treaties
incorporated into domestic law. Part III argues that the uniformity
directive contained in international commercial conventions
changes the interpretive rules of the legal order into which
transnational law is incorporated and makes its interpretation more
complex. A conclusion summarizes the paper’s argument.
A note about the sort of transnational law with which the paper
is concerned is in order. Among the various sorts of laws that count
as transnational are international commercial conventions that have
two features. One is that these conventions, when ratified, displace
domestic law with respect to issues within their scope. The other
feature is that the conventions themselves contain a rule of textual
interpretation that requires taking uniformity into account in the
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construction of their provisions. This uniformity directive,
described below, in turn mandates that the conventions be
interpreted internationally, independent of domestic law.3
UNCITRAL Conventions and Model Laws include the uniformity
directive.4 This paper addresses transnational laws which have both
features.
Not all international commercial conventions contain a
uniformity directive. For example, an “arbitration agreement” or
“arbitral award” subject to the Convention on the Enforcement and
Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards5 (the “New York
Convention”) perhaps should be construed independently of
national law understandings of these terms. It might be a good idea
to require the New York Convention’s terms to be construed
uniformly in accordance with international law. Doing so could
promote one of the New York Convention’s purposes, which is to
provide an international law for the recognition and enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards.6 However, the requirement of a uniform
definition of the New York Convention’s terms is not found within
the Convention itself.7 The uniformity directive, if it applies, does
so based on extra-textual considerations. Although the arguments
below might apply to transnational laws generally, their focus is on
transnational laws that both displace domestic law and contain the
uniformity directive.
3 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(1) (“regard is to be had to [the CISG’s] international
character and the need to promote uniformity in its application . . . in international trade”).
4 See id.
5 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958).
6 See, e.g., Franco Ferrari, How International Must International Arbitration Be?,
in 1 EPPUR SI MUOVE: THE AGE OF UNIFORM LAW 847–855 (Unidroit ed., 2016); GARY
BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 3503 (2d ed. 2014) (explaining the
basics of international arbitration and providing references to judicial decisions and
rewards).
7 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties might support the
requirement that the New York Convention’s provisions be interpreted uniformly,
independent of national law. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969). Article 31(1), which states a general
rule of interpretation of treaties, directs that a treaty’s provisions be interpreted in
accordance with the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty “in light of its object and
purpose.” See id; see also infra text accompanying notes 41–43. This directive requires a
uniform interpretation of a treaty only to the extent that the particular treaty’s object or
purpose is one of uniformity. That is a contingent matter, not one dictated by the
provisions of the treaty.
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I. Methods of Textual Interpretation and Legal Theory
Methods of textual interpretation rely on a theory of the nature
of law and a legal system. This is because, as interpretive devices,
the methods assume that they correctly identify the meaning of legal
texts. To be sure, the meaning of a legal text is independent of the
methods for ascertaining it; otherwise, the exercise is not one of
interpretation but of deeming or declaring the text to have a certain
meaning—a different sort of activity. However, the text’s meaning
can be identified as the semantic content of its terms, the
information the legislature intended to communicate, the
information those subject to the statute reasonably understand the
legislature to communicate, or other information conveyed. Each is
an aspect of its meaning. The law of a legal system determines
which among the candidates counts as the meaning of a legal text,
and the text’s meaning in turn identifies the legal entitlements of the
parties described by the text’s provisions.8 Thus, a method of
textual interpretation is correct or appropriate because it ascertains
this meaning. Because law selects from among candidates the
meaning of a legal text, the method’s correctness or suitability
depends on the nature of law and a legal system.
Given this dependence, the conception of law is primary and
constrains the method of interpreting legal texts. Accordingly, an
interpretive method that misidentifies the meaning of the text is a
bad method. For instance, if a method of textual interpretation
recommends the morally best meaning be given to a statutory
provision, while law consists of authoritative issued commands, the
interpretive method is inappropriate. It identifies the text’s
meaning, if at all, only by accident. Closer to transnational law, if
a particular interpretative method requires reliance on
understandings foreign to domestic law, while law counts as
authoritative only domestic understandings of relevant terms, the
interpretive method is inappropriate.9
8 We take no position on the general jurisprudential question as to whether legal
entitlements are created or discovered. Whether legal entitlements are created or
discovered, textual interpretation’s role identifies those entitlements based on operations
on legal texts having the force of law. Accordingly, throughout this paper we refer to
textual interpretation as “identifying” the entitlements, understanding the term to be
neutral as to whether the meaning of legal texts create or recognize legal entitlements.
9 For recognition of a similar reliance of the legal status of international arbitral
awards on a theory about the nature of law, see EMMANUEL GAILLARD, LEGAL THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2010).
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In addition to constraining methods of textual interpretation,
theories about the nature of law ultimately determine which
methods count as interpretive legal standards. Methods of textual
interpretation are legal standards governing evidence of the
meaning of legal texts. They specify the sort of information on
which an interpretation of the text must be based. As with any legal
standard, an interpretive method counts as a legal standard only if it
is among the norms that constitute law in a legal system. Thus, it is
not enough for a method to specify the sort of evidence for the
meaning of legal texts, even if the evidence is probabilistically
associated with that meaning. This is because a nonlegal
interpretive method conceivably could do the same. That method,
even if correctly ascertaining the meaning of legal texts, would not
be a legally authoritative interpretive norm. It would serve merely
as a guide without the force of law. To be a legally authoritative
norm, the interpretive method must itself be a legal standard. For
this reason, a theory about the nature of law in the end determines
the legal character of methods of textual interpretation.
For example, assume that law consists of authoritatively
promulgated commands.
These commands could include
authoritative orders as to how legal texts are to be interpreted to
determine what is commanded. Among those orders might be the
instruction: “Interpret the terms of the text according to the meaning
intended by the authority promulgating the text.”10 “Interpret the
terms of the text according to their ordinary meaning” might not be
among those commands. In this case interpretation according to
ordinary meaning is a nonlegal interpretive method.
Given that interpretive methods ultimately rely on a legal
theory, on which theory about the nature of law should they rely?
Obviously, the answer is “the correct legal theory.” The trouble, of
course, is that the correct theory of the nature of law and its details
are matters of perennial jurisprudential dispute. The argument in
Part III below that transnational law makes textual interpretation
more difficult does not depend on the truth of a particular theory of
law. It instead takes note of the uncontroversial fact that domestic

10 Cf. Larry Alexander, Legal Positivism and Originalist Interpretation, 16 REVISTA
ARGENTINA DE TEORIA JURIDICA [RATJ] 1, 4 (University of San Diego School of Law
Research Paper No. 15-200, November 2015). If law is authoritative norms posited, it
follows that courts must interpret texts promulgated by authorities according to the
meaning intended of those texts.
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law contains both certain accepted methods of interpretation and
(where transnational law has been ratified) transnational law’s
uniformity directive. Both types of interpretive methods are
accepted as legally valid without regard to their basis in a theory of
law. Part III argues that the combination of these different accepted
methods, not their ultimate jurisprudential foundation, makes the
interpretation of transnational legal texts more complex.
Nonetheless, a theory of law that makes acceptance of interpretive
norms foundational to their legal status is a version of legal
positivism. This Part describes that version.
A. Textual Interpretation for Legal Positivists
Legal positivism is a view about what makes a norm a legal
norm. It holds that law depends on social facts of one sort or
another. Versions of legal positivism differ according to social facts
central to law or the extent of law’s dependence on social facts.
Classical positivism maintains a narrow conception of the social
facts on which law depends. For instance, for John Austin, law
consists of coercive orders issued by one whose orders are
habitually obeyed.11 Contemporary positivists, by contrast, allow a
broader range of social facts, such as the acceptance of certain
criteria of legal validity among officials. Legal positivists also
divide over to the extent to which law depends on social facts.
“Hard” or “exclusive” positivism maintains that the existence and
content of law consists entirely of social facts; “soft” or “inclusive”
positivism allows law to depend partly on matters independent of
social facts, such as moral norms.12
H.L.A. Hart’s version of legal positivism is a prominent type of
“soft” positivism.13 According to Hart’s theory, law depends on the
shared social practice of judges and other legal officials. In
particular, the norms they accept as the ultimate criteria of legal
11 See JOHN AUSTIN, AUSTIN: THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 118–
19 (W. Rumble ed., 1995) (1832).
12 See Jules L. Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 139
(1982); W.J. WALUCHOW, INCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM (1994). Hard and soft positivism
make conceptual claims about law. For different versions of positivism, which make
normative claims about adjudication or legal institutional design, see Frederick Schauer,
Positivism Before Hart, 24 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 455 (2011).
13 See, e.g., Hart, infra note 14, at 250–54; Alexander, supra note 10; Kenneth E.
Himma, Inclusive Legal Positivism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 125 (J.L. Coleman & S. Shapiro eds., 2012).
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validity are the foundation of a legal system.14 For Hart, the legal
system consists of valid legal norms and the norms officially
accepted as the ultimate criteria of validity. Norms are laws within
that system because they are valid according to the criteria.
However, unlike valid norms, the ultimate criteria of validity—what
Hart calls the “rule of recognition”—has no legal basis.15 It is a
presupposition of legal validity, not itself valid. Instead, the criteria
of validity are the result of a shared social practice among legal
officials in which their joint acceptance of the criteria is shown by
their use of the criteria. This practice is a fact about their legal
reasoning and other judicial behavior with respect to this
fundamental norm. At the level of ultimate criteria, law has
whatever content legal officials treat it as having.
Methods of textual interpretation may or may not be part of the
rule of recognition. These methods can include different general
standards such as the injunction to interpret the terms of a legal text
according to their ordinary meaning, their author’s intent, or the
understanding of those subject to the text’s provisions. Interpretive
methods also can include more specific interpretive standards.
Among specific interpretive standards are both linguistic and
substantive canons of interpretation, as they both help determine the
meaning or scope of a legal text.16 Canons such as “penal statutes
are to be construed narrowly,” “the terms of the text are to be
construed according to the meaning of the same terms in
comparable statutes” or “statutes are to be applied generally unless
they clearly indicate a narrower application” are examples.
Whether interpretive standards are general or more specific, their
place in a system of legal norms depends on the way they figure in
the official practice of interpreting texts.
Broadly, interpretive standards can play two different possible
roles within official legal practice. One is as underived basic legal
norms. Judges commonly accept interpretive standards, relying on
them to determine the legal entitlements identified by statute or
other legal text. In this case, following Hart, the interpretive
methods are among the ultimate legal norms in the legal system in

14

H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 100 (3d ed. 2012).
Cf. id. at 109 (maintaining that the rule of recognition “can neither be valid nor
invalid but is simply accepted”).
16 See generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012).
15
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which they are used.17 The other possibility is that interpretive
standards are derivable from other legal norms, whether or not legal
officials commonly accept them. In this case these standards would
be valid interpretive norms, but not among the legal system’s
foundational norms. More likely, some interpretive standards might
be underived and officially accepted while others are derivable from
ultimate criteria of validity. Whether interpretive methods are
among the ultimate legal norms or are derived from them is both a
logical matter (broadly understood) concerning the derivability of
interpretive norms and an empirical matter concerning the norms
judges commonly accept.
B. An Implication for Transnational Law
Hart’s version of legal positivism has a direct implication for the
incorporation of transnational law into domestic law. Because the
rule of recognition serves to identify legal norms as the norms of a
legal system, a change in the criteria of validity shifts the legal
system. Thus, if interpretive methods are part of the rule of
recognition, the introduction of a novel method shifts the legal
system into which it is incorporated. The same is not true where, in
accordance with authoritative criteria, one valid norm supplants
another valid norm. A change in a legal rule according to ultimate
criteria that are unchanged leaves the character of the legal system
unaltered. For example, the Himalaya Clause, incorporated into
U.S. law from English law by decision,18 doesn’t change the
character of the U.S. legal system. It only alters a substantive rule
insulating certain non-privity parties from liability to the cargo
owner for damage or loss of the cargo.19 Accordingly, if
transnational law’s uniformity directive as an interpretive standard
is part of the rule of recognition, the incorporation of transnational

17

See Kent Greenawalt, Hart’s Rule of Recognition in the United States, 1 RATIO
40, 48–50 (1988).
18 See Herd & Co. v. Krawill Machinery Corp., 359 U.S. 297 (1959); cf. Contracts
(Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, c. 31 § 6(5)(a) (U.K.) [https://perma.cc/X8H7-AR62];
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods
Wholly or Partly by Sea, art. 19 (2009), supra note 1. The English case recognizing the
validity of the clause is Adler v. Dickson, [1954] 2 LLR 267 (U.K.).
19 See generally Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. James N. Kirby Pty Ltd., 543 U.S. 14 (2004)
(explaining that Himalaya clause protections in multimodal bills of lading apply to a
railroad transporting goods on the final leg of journey of the cargo as well as to the ocean
carrier).
JUR.
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law shifts the legal system into which it is incorporated.
The question, then, is whether transnational law’s uniformity
directive is among the ultimate criteria of validity in a legal system
that has incorporated the directive. Hartian positivism counts a
norm as law only if the norm is part of the rule of recognition or
derived from norms that are part of that rule. Ratification of an
international commercial convention incorporates the uniformity
directive where the directive is among the convention’s provisions.
The question is the status of the directive among the legal norms of
a ratifying country.
Although the question is an empirical one concerning the norms
legal officials in a ratifying country commonly use, the directive
appears not to be among the ultimate criteria of validity. This is
because the directive is part of a convention that is ratified in
accordance with the treaty-making powers authorized by the law of
the ratifying country. The treaty therefore cannot itself be part of
the criteria that gives to specified authorities the power to make
treaties. As such the treaty and its provisions, including the
uniformity directive, cannot be part of the ultimate criteria of
validity.20 Instead, the ratified treaty and its interpretive directive is
legally valid in virtue of its derivation from a foundational norm.
Whatever the basis of the authority of other interpretive standards,
the uniformity directive’s authority derives from other legal norms.
Routine judicial behavior in dealing with treaties confirms the
derivative character of the uniformity directive. To determine
whether transnational law applies to create legal entitlements, courts
inquire whether it is part of national law. As a threshold question,
the inquiry seeks to confirm that the relevant international
commercial convention has been ratified and, where necessary,
given domestic effect through implementing legislation.21 Having
confirmed transnational law’s application, courts frequently go on
to rely on the uniformity directive within the convention to construe

20 For complexities in identifying the ultimate criteria of validity in the United States,
see Greenawalt, supra note 17.
21 See, e.g., VLM Food Trading Int’l, Inc. v. Ill. Trading Co., 748 F.3d 780 (7th Cir.
2014); Asante Tech., Inc. v. PMC-Sierra, Inc., 164 F.Supp.2d 1142 (N.D. Cal. 2001);
Chicago Prime Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co., 408 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 2005)
(providing examples of cases that apply international transnational law, like the CISG, in
domestic judicial proceedings).

2022

TRANSNATIONAL LAW & TREATY INTERPRETATION

381

that law’s provisions.22
This interpretive practice is not
exceptionless; courts in ratifying countries appear to differ as to how
seriously they take uniformity directive.23 Nonetheless, even courts
that fail to act on the uniformity directive give lip service to it.
It is worth emphasizing what follows and what does not follow
from the derivative character of transnational law’s uniformity
directive. Because the directive’s authority derives from the
ultimate criteria of validity, it is not part of that criteria. Thus,
ratification of transnational law in accordance with the criteria does
not by itself amount to a shift in the legal system of the ratifying
country. This is true even though the uniformity directive, as part
of transnational law, introduces a novel standard of textual
interpretation into domestic law. However, the fact that the ultimate
rule of validity is unchanged does not mean that the content of the
legal system of which it is a part is unaltered. The introduction of a
novel interpretive standard arguably significantly changes the
authorized interpretive methods available to a court. As a secondorder standard that determines how a legal text identifies legal
entitlements provided by transnational law, the uniformity directive
often will be relied on. It potentially will help determine the scope
of transnational law as well as its content. This is so particularly
where key provisions of transnational law are vague, as is the case
with a number of provisions in UNCITRAL’s model laws. Perhaps
most importantly, to construe transnational law uniformly, the
directive requires courts to take into account the interpretations of
that law by foreign courts—not merely as guidance, but as a legal
obligation. Taken together, these changes in interpretive practice
count as an important shift in law. Part III argues that this change
makes the textual interpretation of transnational more difficult.
C. The Problem of Controversy
There is a familiar problem with Hart’s practice-based account
of law. On Hart’s account, the ultimate criteria of law are
determined by the convergent practice among legal officials. This
requires wide official consensus as to the criteria norms must satisfy

22 See, e.g., Officine Maraldi S.p.A. v. Intessa BCI S.p.A. et al., CISG-online case
no. 1780, Tribunale di Forli (It.) (Feb. 16, 2009) [https://perma.cc/U4CS-52HP].
23 Compare id., with Hellenic Petro, LLC v. Elbow River Mktg. Ltd., 2019 WL
6114892 (E.D. Cal., Nov. 18, 2019); Raw Materials, Inc. v. Manfred Forberich GmbH &
Co., 53 UCC Rep. Serv.2d 878 (N.D. Ill. 2004).

382

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLVII

to count as law. But courts and other legal officials often disagree
about controlling legal standards, including the most fundamental
norms. Their practice reveals controversy, not wide acceptance, as
to the governing criteria of validity. The presence of this sort of
controversy means that Hartian positivism, dependent as it is on
convention, therefore cannot be true.24 With respect to methods of
textual interpretation, judicial practice exhibits a similar lack of
consensus. Courts disagree over whether legal texts are to be
interpreted according to ordinary meaning, the drafter’s intentions
or some admixture of the two. The presence of controversy here
prevents interpretive methods from being among the ultimate
criteria of validity.25
A Hartian positivist has several possible responses to the
problem. One is that there is wide official consensus over
interpretive standards cast in suitably general terms. Disagreement,
when it exists, is instead over specific formulations of these
standards. This is expected when a standard lacks a canonical
linguistic formulation, as provided in an authoritative legal
document. Another response is that the controversy is over the
application of these standards, not the standards themselves.26 For
instance, although legal officials agree that the terms of statutes are
to be given their ordinary meaning, they disagree about what that
meaning is. As another example, although officials agree that a
federal statute’s terms are not to apply to a particular outcome
unless Congress evinces a clear intent to the contrary, they might
disagree as to whether Congress has evinced the requisite intent.
For two reasons, it is unnecessary to decide here whether these
responses are convincing. First, whatever official consensus or
controversy there may be with respect to other interpretive methods,
official acceptance of the uniformity directive is unnecessary. The
directive is valid in virtue of being a provision of a treaty, which
itself has been ratified in accordance with other legal rules.27 As the
24 For a classic statement of the objection, see RONALD DWORKIN, The Model of Rules
I, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 29 (1977); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 15–30
(1986).
25 See Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, Pluralistic Nonoriginalism and the
Combinability Problem, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1739, 1757–58 (2013).
26 See JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 99–100, 118 (2001).
27 For example, the United States has ratified the CISG in accordance with Article II
of the federal constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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directive’s authority is not part of the ultimate criteria of legal
validity, it is enough that the directive is derivable from the criteria.
Second, there appears to be wide official consensus as to the
authority of transnational law’s uniformity directive. For both
reasons, the problem of controversy is not a problem for the
mandate to interpret transnational law uniformly.
II. Methods of Textual Interpretation: The Interpretive
Mandate
Hartian positivism is only one of many different theories of law,
even among legal positivists. There is no consensus as to the correct
theory of law; all are subject to continuing controversy. Even if
there were consensus, there still could be disagreement about which
interpretive methods were grounded in the consensus theory of law.
For both reasons, because interpretive methods depend on a theory
of law, which interpretive methods are linked to the correct legal
theory also is controversial. Nonetheless, both domestic and treaty
law recognize a variety of specific methods of interpretation of legal
texts. These methods are in some, and perhaps many, instances a
diverse lot. Predominant among them is the injunction to construe
legal texts according to the ordinary meaning of their terms, the
intended meaning of the enacting legislature or the understanding
of those subject to text’s provisions, or to promote the legislative
purpose for which the text was enacted. Canons of textual
interpretation, some reflecting aspects of linguistic communication
generally and others the understandings peculiar to law, create
interpretive presumptions. They add further tools of interpretation.
The plurality of different recognized legal methods makes
textual interpretation difficult, whatever the correct theory of law
might be. It makes the outcomes of interpretation unpredictable in
hard cases, where equally authoritative methods underwrite
different results. In short, the problem is at the level of
interpretation, not at the foundational level of the nature of law. This
Part briefly describes the plurality of interpretive methods present
in domestic law and the law of treaties. Its purpose is not to criticize
this state of affairs—the subject of a large literature--but to establish
a baseline of sorts against which the uncertainty in the interpretation
of transnational law can be assessed. Part III argues that, compared
to this benchmark, the incorporation of the uniformity directive into
domestic law makes the textual interpretation of transnational law
even more uncertain and its results unpredictable.
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A. Pluralistic and Constrained Interpretive Approaches
Legal systems tend to authorize similar methods of textual
interpretation.28 However, even when legal orders share the same
interpretive methods, they can differ as to the rules (if any) for
employing authorized methods. For instance, both the injunction to
construe statutes according to their ordinary meaning and the
legislative purpose behind their enactment might be part of two
different legal systems. One country’s law might contain a rule
giving effect to legislative purpose over ordinary meaning while a
rule of the other country’s law requires giving effect to ordinary
meaning over legislative purpose. Without a rule or principle that
makes coherent use of various authorized interpretive methods, the
methods merely provide a variety of considerations that judges may
take into account in interpreting a legal text. An advantage of
transnational textual interpretation is that it introduces an authorized
common interpretive method into domestic law.
The authorized interpretive strategies of countries fall broadly
into two approaches. One approach recognizes a variety of different
interpretive methods with no mandated priority or weight given to
any method. The other approach fixes a method or a principle for
making different recognized interpretive methods coherent. The
first approach is pluralistic, while the second is constrained. U.S.
law governing statutory interpretation is an instance of the
pluralistic stance. There is no federal statute that instructs courts
how to interpret statutes generally. Although there are statutory
rules that apply to the interpretation of federal statutes, they are not
instructions for construing the meaning of statutory provisions.29
The federal statutes that contain provisions prescribing how the

28 See Gerrard Carney, Comparative Approaches to Statutory Interpretation in Civil
and Common Law Jurisdictions, 36 STATUTE L. REV. 46, 58 (2014); ROBERT S. SUMMERS
ET AL., Interpretation and Comparative Analysis, in INTERPRETING STATUTES: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 407 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 2016). For
country surveys, see id. For the common origins of methods of statutory interpretation in
civil law and common law, see Horst Klaus Lücke, Statutory Interpretation: New
Comparative Dimensions, 54 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 1023 (2005) (book review).
29 The Dictionary Act, for instance, applies generally to all federal statutes. See 1
U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2021). In providing definitions of statutory terms, the Act assists in their
interpretation. However, its definitions are not exhaustive and say nothing about how
statutory provisions, in which the terms defined by the Act appear, are to be construed.
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statute is to be interpreted are limited to specific subject matters.30
Instead, interpretive methods with general application are created
by judges. Courts recognize a variety of methods as authoritative,
none of which has priority over the others.31
Gluck and Posner report that the federal appellate judges they
surveyed overwhelmingly take a pluralistic approach to statutory
interpretation.32 Most adopt an approach they describe as
“intentional eclecticism”: a strategy that uses all available materials
to implement what the court takes to be the Congressional intent
expressed in legislation. At the same time, they find that a minority
of judges surveyed, who rely on other stances to statutory
interpretation, also make use of a range of interpretive materials.
Gluck and Posner’s study confirms that federal judges use a variety
of interpretive methods. This eclecticism in method is present even
when individual appellate judges differ in their general approach to
statutory interpretation. An unanswered question is whether
Congress or the Supreme Court has the authority to declare rules of
statutory interpretation binding on lower courts.33
The second approach is “constrained.” Rather than authorizing
a variety of interpretive methods, without a rule or principle making
them coherent, domestic law can give a particular method priority
or weight as part of its general rule of interpretation. The method
given priority or weight by the rule constrains the use of other
interpretive methods. In interpreting statutes in accordance with the
general rule, courts can rely on an interpretive method only if its use
is consistent with the prescribed method.
The extent to which the constraint is restrictive depends, of
course, on the content of the general rule or principle that gives

30 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 102 (2021) (U.S. Bankruptcy Code rules of construction);
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, General Rules of Interpretation and
Additional U.S. Rules of Interpretation, 19 U.S.C. § 1202, available at
https://hts.usitc.gov/current [https://perma.cc/ZC55-LET6].
31 See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the
Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L.
REV. 1298 (2018); Frank Easterbrook, The Absence of Method in Statutory Interpretation,
81 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 81, 84 (2017); Berman & Toh, supra note 25, at 1757–1758.
32 Gluck & Posner, supra note 31, at 1303.
33 See, e.g., Nicholas Quinn Rosencranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation,
115 HARV. L. REV. 2086 (2002); Gluck & Posner, supra note 31, at 1346; Aaron-Andrew
P. Bruhl, Eager to Follow: Methodological Precedent in Statutory Interpretation, 99 N.C.
L. REV. 101 (2020).
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priority or weight to a particular method. For example, an
instruction to interpret a statute according to the ordinary meaning
of its terms, without exception, is a highly restrictive constraint.34
Louisiana’s general rule of statutory interpretation, although less
restrictive, imposes a significant constraint on interpretive method:
“When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not
lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and
no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the
legislature.”35 This rule prizes textual meaning over other
interpretive tools, where the provision’s limitations do not apply.
By comparison, Arizona’s general rule is less constraining. It
provides that statutes “should be liberally construed to effect their
objects and to promote justice.”36 While requiring resort to
legislative intent (“objects”), the rule does not bar reliance on
textual meaning to construe a statute.
Mildly constraining are certain “Interpretation Acts” enacted in
the countries of the British Commonwealth. Some of these Acts
contain general rules of construction. For example, Australia’s
Victoria Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 prescribes how
statutes are to be interpreted. Article 35 of the Act provides:
In the interpretation of a provision of an Act or subordinate
instrument—(a) a construction that would promote the purpose
or object underlying the Act or subordinate instrument (whether
or not that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act or
subordinate instrument) shall be preferred to a construction that
would not promote that purpose or object[.]37

34 Cf. COLO. REV. STAT. § 2-4-101 (2021) (“Words and phrases shall be read in
context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage. Words and
phrases that have acquired a technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative
definition or otherwise, shall be construed accordingly.”).
35 LA. CIV. CODE ANN., art. 9 (2021).
36 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 1-211 (LexisNexis 2021); accord IOWA CODE § 4.2 (2021)
(offering that statutes shall be liberally construed to promote their objects and “assist the
parties in obtaining justice”).
37 Interpretation
of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic) s 35 (Austl.)
(http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_act/iola1984322/)
[https://perma.cc/2TWJ-MB7Q]. Cf. Singapore Interpretation Act 1965 § 9A
(https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/IA1965?ProvIds=P12-#pr9A)
[https://perma.cc/5KMQZM56]; Laws of Malaysia, Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 § 17A (2006)
(Commonwealth Countries Interpretation Acts) (https://ppuu.upm.edu.my/upload
/dokumen/20180726160154RUJ_3_INTERPRETATION_ACT_388.pdf)
[https://perma.cc/GPL8-WVNX].
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By its terms, the Article requires that a statutory interpretation
construe the legislative purpose expressed in the statute.
Considered alone, the Article limits authorized interpretive methods
to those aimed at discovering legislative intent. However, under
Australian law the process of interpretation is not confined to giving
effect to the legislative purpose fixed in a statute. Rather,
interpretation is a three-stage affair involving the text of the
provision, the statutory context in which the provision appears, and
the legislative purpose behind the provision. This process is the
“text, context, purpose” approach to statutory interpretation.38
Interpretation by “text, context, purpose” does not significantly
constrain the use of these interpretive methods. Although the
process excludes some interpretive methods, such as legislative
intentions not reflected in the statute, it does not give priority or
special weight to purpose over text or context. Rather, these
methods appear to have equal importance in interpretation. As often
noted, the text of the statute is the starting point for any
interpretation if there are contentious issues in its construction.39
Courts adopt the ordinary or plain meaning of the statute’s terms:
“the meaning commonly attached to words by the users of them.”40
However, the ordinary or plain meaning will not always be
determinative. Scientific, technical, and legal terms of art are to be
given their specific technical meaning.41 Because the legislative
intent is given effect only if it is fixed in the statute, the meaning of
the statute must be determined independently of legislative purpose.
Otherwise, there is no difference between what the statute provides
and what the legislature intended it to provide. Textual meaning is
primary. For this reason, in its role in statutory interpretation the
meaning of the text constrains the legislative purpose as much as
the legislative purpose constrains the meaning of the text.
Even considered alone, Article 35’s rule favouring a purposive
38 See James Duffy & John O’Brien, When Interpretation Acts Require
Interpretation: Purposive Statutory Interpretation and Criminal Liability in Queensland,
40 U. NEW S. WALES L. J. 952, 952 (2017) (describing the Australian High Court’s
“modern approach” to statutory interpretation).
39 See Australian Fin Direct Ltd v Dir of Consumer Affs, (Vic) [2007] HCA 57
(Austl.).
40 KIM LEWISON & DAVID HUGHES, THE INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS IN
AUSTRALIA 167 (4th ed. 2012).
41 See N Guthridge Ltd v Wilfley Ore Concentrator Syndicate, Ltd, [1906] CLR 583
(Austl.).
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interpretation is only mildly restrictive. For one thing, the
legislative purpose behind a statute might not be apparent from the
text or extrinsic materials. Further complicating the inquiry into
purpose is the familiar problem that the purpose often represents a
legislative compromise, which itself can be hard to discern with any
precision. In both cases, Article 35’s directive does not help
interpret a statute. Beyond these difficulties, the Article does not
help select an interpretation in cases in which there is more than one
equally plausible construction. Suppose there are two different
statutory constructions equally supported by the text’s meaning.
Suppose too that both constructions would promote the legislative
purpose reflected in the statute. Because Article 35 requires
selecting the construction that promotes the statute’s purpose, it
does not prefer one construction over the other. The preference for
one of the constructions therefore must be made on a basis other
than that described in Article 35.42
Both pluralistic and constrained approaches to statutory
interpretation, to different extents, leave courts with discretion as to
the choice of interpretive method. Domestic law lacking a general
rule of interpretation permits a court to select among authorized
interpretive methods.43 Under that law a court can rely on one or
more of these methods to interpret a statute. It can base its
construction only on the text of the relevant statute. Alternatively,
the court can rely on legislative purpose, canons of construction or
other authorized methods in addition to the meaning of the text.

42 Even less restrictive are the general rules of construction contained in the Uniform
Statute and Rule Construction Act (1995), proposed for adoption by the Uniform Law
Commission. See UNIF. STATUTE AND RULE CONSTR. ACT (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1995).
Under section 18 of the Act, a statute is to be interpreted inter alia to give effect to its
objective and purpose as well its entire text. Id. § 18(a)(1), (2). For its part, section 19
provides that the statute’s text is the primary source of its meaning. Because section 18
requires interpretation to give effect to both the entire text and legislative purpose, both
interpretive methods are of equal importance. Neither therefore constrains the other. Only
one state (New Mexico) to date has enacted the Act. See N.M. STAT. ANN. 12-2A-1 et seq.
(2021).
43 Justice Breyer describes the interpretive discretion a pluralistic approach gives
courts: “[T]he fact that most judges agree that these basic elements—language, history,
tradition, precedent, purpose, and consequence—are useful does not mean they agree
about just where and how to use them. Some judges emphasize the use of language,
history, and tradition. Others emphasize purpose and consequence. The differences of
emphasis matters . . .” STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 6 (2004).
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Lacking a general rule organizing interpretive methods, a pluralistic
approach allows a court to choose the interpretive method that
seems appropriate to the statutory issue presented.
A general rule of interpretation constrains the choice of
interpretive method. However, the extent to which the rule limits a
court’s discretion depends on the content of the constraint. A
precise rule requiring use of a particular interpretive method without
limitation does not allow reliance on other methods, but a rule with
lesser effect allows some discretion in the choice of interpretive
tools. For instance, a rule that bars reliance on legislative history to
discern statutory meaning unless the statute is ambiguous leaves to
the court the choice of method when the statute is ambiguous.44 If
the court finds the statute to be ambiguous, it can rely on legislative
history as well as other interpretive tools. Likewise, a rule that
prescribes the purpose of statutory interpretation leaves to the
court’s discretion the choice of interpretive method to promote that
purpose. The rule limits but does not require use of a particular
interpretive method. Where domestic law contains general rules of
interpretation, it appears to allow discretion in the choice of
interpretive methods. As argued in the next section, the rules of
interpretation applicable to treaties also give courts discretion in
interpretation.
B. The Treaty Law Benchmark
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT” or
“Vienna Convention”) governs the interpretation of treaties.45 Its
rules of interpretation apply in virtue of ratification of the treaty or
customary international law, which contains interpretive rules
reflected in the VCLT.46 Under the VCLT the aim of interpretation
is to construe the treaty according to the meaning intended by the
parties to it.47 Article 31 of the VCLT provides three rules of
44

Cf. Pepper v. Hart, [1992] UKHL 3, 1 All E.R. 42 (U.K.).
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1969).
46 See, e.g., RICHARD GARDNER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 18 (2d ed. 2015);
Gonzales v. Guitterrez, 311 F.3d 942, 949 n.15 (9th Cir. 2002); Haitian Centers Council
v. Sales, 969 F.2d 1350, 1361-1362 (2d Cir. 1992); cf. Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign
Relations of the United States § 306 comm. a (2018) (concluding the VCLT’s rules of
treaty interpretation are accepted as reflecting customary international law, including by
the United States).
47 See 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 31(4) (arguing that special meaning be given to a treaty
45
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interpretation to meet this aim. Article 31(1) states the first rule: a
treaty is to be interpreted in good faith “in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in light of its object and purpose.”48 The two other rules
require consideration of certain sources to interpret the treaty under
Article 31(1)’s rule. As a second rule, Article 31(2) stipulates that,
in addition to the text, the context comprises two sorts of items:
agreements relating to the treaty made by all treaty parties at the
treaty’s conclusion, and instruments made in connection with the
treaty’s conclusion and accepted by other parties as instruments
relating to the treaty. The third rule, stated in Article 31(3), requires
consideration of three sorts of items in addition to the context:
subsequent agreements concerning the treaty’s interpretation made
between the treaty parties, subsequent practices in applying the
treaty which establishes an agreement regarding its interpretation,
and relevant rules of international law applicable to relations
between the parties.
Although Article 31(1)’s rule states a requirement that
interpretations must meet, not the methods to be used to satisfy that
requirement, certain methods of interpretation are reliably
associated with the requirement. Conventional meaning discloses
the ordinary meaning of treaty terms. For its part, information about
the entire text of the treaty as well as agreements between treaty
parties made at the conclusion of the treaty describes the context in
which the treaty’s terms are produced. Finally, the intent of the
drafters in drafting a term is relevant to the term’s purpose. Each of
these interpretive methods helps interpret a treaty according to the
ordinary meaning of its terms, taking into account context and the
term’s purpose, respectively.
The VCLT rules of interpretation constrain the use of
interpretive methods to construe treaties. In particular, Article 32
restricts reliance on preparatory work in the process of construction.
The Article only permits recourse to supplementary material such
as preparatory work to confirm or determine the meaning in two
circumstances: when the interpretation in accordance with Article
31 leaves meaning ambiguous or obscure or when Article 31’s
term if the parties’ intended meaning is established); Ulf Linderfalk, Is Treaty
Interpretation an Art or a Science? International Law and Rational Decision Making, 26
EUR. J. INT’L L. 169, 172-73 (2015).
48 See 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 31(4) (1969).
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application produces a manifestly absurd or unreasonable result. By
its terms, Article 32 gives priority to the interpretive methods
permitted under Article 31’s general rules.49 Preparatory work can
be used to clarify the meaning of a treaty provision only if
application of Article 31’s rules do not do so. If Article 31’s rules
do not leave the meaning of the provision ambiguous or obscure, or
yield an absurd or unreasonable result, Article 32 does not allow
reliance on preparatory work to clarify the meaning.
Nonetheless, Article 32’s constraint on the use of preparatory
material is mild. This is because Article 31(1) is sufficiently
malleable to avoid Article 32’s application. As noted above, Article
31(1)’s rule requires that the treaty’s terms be interpreted in
accordance with their ordinary meaning, taking into account context
and the terms’ purpose. This rule of interpretation is not a plain
meaning rule. It does not prize conventional meaning over context
or the purpose for which the term is used.50 Article 31(1) instead
mandates that the construction be based on the conventional
meaning of terms, the context of the enactment, and their intended
effect. According to the Article, treaty terms must be interpreted
according to the ordinary meaning, “in light of” context and their
“object or purpose.” Thus, for purposes of construing the meaning
of a treaty term, none of these interpretive methods is given priority.
Each is on par with the other. As a result, Article 31(1) gives no
guidance where reliance on the methods yields conflicting results.
It follows that a court can exercise its interpretive discretion
given by Article 31(1) to allow or bar reliance on preparatory
materials. For example, the ordinary meaning of a treaty term might
conflict with the purpose for which the use of the term was intended.
In this case Article 31(1) leaves to the court the choice of
interpretive method to construe the term’s meaning. In light of the
conflict among interpretive methods, the court can find the meaning

49 See Ulf Linderfalk, Is the Hierarchical Structure of Articles 31 and 32 of the
Vienna Convention Real or Not? Interpreting the Rules of Interpretation, 49 NETH. INT’L
L. REV. 133, 136 (2007).
50 See ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 206-207 (3d ed. 2013)
(arguing that Article 31(1) gives no greater weight to one factor over others). For
assertions that Article 31 describes a plain meaning rule, see Rebecca M. Kysar,
Interpreting Tax Treaties, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1327, 1402 (2016) (concluding that the
Vienna Convention adopts a “plain meaning approach” to interpretation); Evan Criddle,
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and U.S. Treaty Interpretation, 44 VA. J.
INT’L L. 431, 438 (2004) (Article 31 states a “robust textualist canon”).
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to be unclear. Accordingly, Article 32(a) permits it to rely on
preparatory materials to clarify the term’s meaning. Alternatively,
the court can rely on either the term’s ordinary meaning or its
intended purpose to clarify the term’s meaning in a way that avoids
an absurd or unreasonable result. Clarified in accordance with the
interpretive methods permitted by Article 31(1), Article 32 does not
allow preparatory materials to inform the meaning of the term.
The presence of interpretive discretion makes construction of a
treaty sometimes difficult, and a forecast of its judicial construction
based on interpretive methods uncertain. Different interpretive
methods provide different sorts of evidence about the meaning of
the text, and without a prescribed method for combining them, it is
hard to know whether an interpretation is correct. More to the point,
the outcome of a judicial interpretation of a treaty is sometimes hard
to predict based on the rules of interpretation of treaties. The extent
to which discretion makes treaty interpretation difficult is an
empirical question about the application of interpretive methods to
specific treaties, about which we have nothing to say. For purposes
of describing a benchmark against which transnational law can be
compared, it is enough to note the discretion in the rules of treaty
interpretation leaves to courts. Part III argues that, compared to this
benchmark, transnational law makes interpretation more difficult to
predict.
There is a question as to whether the rules of treaty
interpretation apply to legislation implementing treaties. The law
of the United States and a few other nations distinguishes between
two sorts of treaties: self-executing and non-self-executing. Selfexecuting treaties have automatic effect as part of domestic law.
They do not require implementing legislation to be enforceable as
domestic law in court. Non-self-executing treaties, to have
domestic effect, require implementing legislation. UNCITRAL
conventions are a mix of self-executing and non-self-executing
treaties.51 The VCLT’s rules of treaty interpretation, as a
51 See, e.g., Delchi Carrier S.p.A. v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1027 (2d Cir.
1995); Filanto S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int’l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(offering that the CISG is a self-executing treaty); Secretary of State, Letter of Submission,
August 8, 2014, Senate Consideration of Treaty Document 114-19, available at
www.congress.gov (concluding that the United Nations Convention on Independent
Guarantees and Stand-By Letters of Credit is a non-self-executing treaty). Whether a treaty
is self-executing or non-self-executing sometimes is unclear. Compare CLMS Mgmt.
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codification of customary international law, apply to the
construction of self-executing treaties, even in the courts of nations
that have not ratified the Vienna Convention.52
The interpretive rules applicable to legislation implementing
non-self-executing treaties are less clear. Two different positions on
the matter can be taken. One is that, because a non-self-executing
treaty is enforceable domestically only by legislation, domestic law
rules of statutory interpretation control. The other position is that
the VCLT’s rules of interpretation applicable to treaties also govern
the interpretation of legislation implementing a treaty.53 U.S. courts
appear to take the latter position, at least where the legislation tracks
the treaty’s language.54 We do not have to decide which view is
correct. If domestic law rules of statutory interpretation govern the
Serv. Ltd. P’ship v. Amwins Brokerage of Ga., LLC, 8 F.4th 1007, 1024 (9th Cir. 2021)
(arguing the New York Convention is a self-executing treaty), with Stephan v. Am. Int’l
Ins., 66 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1995) (arguing that the New York Convention not selfexecuting).
52 See, e.g., Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1975)
(applying the VCLT rules to the construction of the Warsaw Convention).
53 The source of authority (if any) to apply the VCLT’s rules of interpretation to
domestic legislation implementing a treaty is controversial. One view might be that
customary international law, as federal common law, authorizes application of the VCLT’s
rules to the interpretation of implementing legislation. An opposing view is that the statute
implementing a treaty evinces a presumptive Congressional intent authorizing the use of
the VCLT’s rules to interpret the statute’s provisions. Cf. Bart M.J. Szewczyk, Customary
International Law and Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis of Federal Court
Decisions, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1118, 1133-1134 (2014) (arguing that federal courts
rely on legislative intent to justify reliance on customary international law in statutory
interpretation). The controversy implicates the general question as to whether customary
international law is federal law, applicable without the need for enacting legislation. For
a sample of the large literature on the question, see Ernest Young, Sorting Out the Debate
Over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365 (2002); Curtis A. Bradley &
Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of
the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997).
54 See, e.g., Pliego v. Hayes, 843 F.3d 226 (6th Cir. 2001); cf. United States v.
Martinez, 599 F.Supp.2d 784 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (finding the statute implementing Protocol
to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child
Prostitution, and Child Pornography should be interpreted based on the VCLT’s rules of
interpretation); Rebecca Crootof, Judicious Influence: Non-Self-Executing Treaties and
the Charming Betsy Canon, 120 YALE L. J. 1784, 1801-1805 (2011) (surveying cases in
which non-executing treaties influence the interpretation of statutes); cf. John F. Coyle,
Incorporative Statutes and the Borrowed Treaty Rule, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 655 (2010)
(recommending that the interpretation of a statute implementing a treaty be interpreted
consistent with the interpretation of the treaty). For the same view taken by Australian
courts, see Ackers v Saad Investment Co, Ltd, [2010] FCA 1221 ¶ 45 (Austl.).
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construction of statutes implementing non-self-executing treaties,
the benchmark against which transnational law can be compared
will not be treaty law. Domestic law rules instead are the
appropriate baseline against which the difficulty of interpreting
implementing statutes is assessed. However, domestic law rules of
statutory interpretation, like the VCLT’s interpretive rules, are an
unstructured mix of standards that leave courts with discretion in
the selection and application of interpretive methods.55 Thus, the
argument in Part III is unaffected by the change in the benchmark
of comparison. The argument’s conclusion that transnational law
makes interpretation more difficult holds even if domestic law rules
control the interpretation of implementing statutes. For ease of
presentation, Part III assumes that the VCLT’s rules of
interpretation govern the interpretation of statutes implementing
non-self-executing treaties.
III. The Uniformity Directive in the Interpretation of
Transnational Law
Transnational law complicates treaty interpretation. This is
because its uniformity directive introduces a method of
interpretation foreign to VCLT’s methods applicable to the
interpretation of treaties generally. The uniformity directive is
mandatory: courts must take uniformity into account in interpreting
the treaty’s provisions, whatever other interpretive tools are
available to them. The directive adds to, rather than replaces, the
methods for interpreting treaties generally. This increases the
variety of methods courts must take into account in construing
transnational law.
Although the VCLT’s rules of treaty
interpretation constrain the choice of interpretive methods, the
addition of the uniformity directive alters the constraint. The altered
constraint increases the discretion courts have in the selection of
methods to interpret transnational law. In increasing the interpretive
discretion, the uniformity directive makes interpretation more
difficult than it would be without the directive. This Part describes
and defends the claims on which this conclusion is based.
A. Uniformity as an Interpretive Method
The uniformity directive is the requirement that an interpretation

55

See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
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of a treaty take uniformity in the treaty’s application into account.56
There are different versions of this directive. At a minimum, a
uniform application of a treaty’s provision requires the applying
tribunal to recognize how other tribunals have construed the
provision, and give their construction some weight in its own
construction of the provision.57 A more demanding requirement of
uniformity is that the applying tribunal give weight to the reasoning
other tribunals offer in support of their constructions. A yet
different demand for uniformity requires the tribunal to forecast the
prospect that its interpretation will become the consensus
interpretation. Although these demands all require that an
interpretation take uniformity into account, they differ as to the way
in which uniformity must be considered, or the sort of uniformity
that must be taken into account in the interpretation. The language
of the uniformity directive in international commercial law
conventions is consistent with these different understandings of the
uniformity requirement.58
Whatever its specific content, a uniformity directive considers a
consensus in interpretation among tribunals to be a reason for the
interpreting tribunal to adopt the same construction. In this the
directive is in an important respect similar to a range of phenomena
that are “path dependent.” In the broadest sense of the term, an
economic outcome is path dependent if it results from or is
influenced by previous choices, rather than current conditions.59 A
56 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(1) (“[R]egard is to be had to [the CISG’s]
international character and the need to promote uniformity in its application . . . in
international trade.”).
57 See, e.g., Hub St Equip Pty Ltd v Energy City Qatar Co., [2021] FCAFC 110 ¶ 18
(Austl.) (“Due regard should be paid to the reasoned decisions of the courts of other
countries where their laws are either based on, or take their content from, international
conventions or instruments such as the New York Convention and the Model Law [on
International Commercial Arbitration]….”); cf. Ginger Dixon, The Harmonizing Directive
of Section 1508: Foreign Case Law’s Role in Interpreting Chapter 15 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code, 36 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 435 (2016) (recommending that section 1508
of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code be construed to require courts to treat as persuasive authority
foreign case law interpreting provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border
Insolvency Act, as adopted, similar to provisions of Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code).
58 See, e.g., CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(1) (arguing that, in the interpretation of the
CISG, “regard is to be had . . . to the need to promote uniformity in its application . . . in
international trade”).
59 See Stan J. Leibowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In and
History, 11 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995). For legal applications of path dependence, see
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path dependent outcome may not be efficient or suitable to current
conditions but persists given previous choices. To be sure, the
uniformity directive is an interpretive method—a normative
requirement—not a causal explanation. Nonetheless, at the level of
interpretation, the directive counts a consensus in the constructions
in previous decisions as a reason for adopting the same construction
in the instant case. The directive requires path dependence in treaty
interpretation.
Transnational law’s uniformity directive understands the
demand for uniformity in interpretation in a particular way. Many
of the UNCITRAL’s products contain a uniformity directive, stated
in almost identical terms.60 Of these products, the CISG is the most
widely adopted. Article 7 of the CISG provides that “[i]n the
interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its
international character and to the need for uniformity in its
application and the observance of good faith in international
trade.”61 The Article’s uniformity directive is weak. Article 7 does
not specify how much weight the need for uniformity must be given
in the CISG’s interpretation. It requires only that the applying
tribunal have “regard for” this need. To have “regard for”
uniformity in interpretation demands at a minimum that the way
other tribunals have construed a provision, including foreign courts,
be a consideration that the applying tribunal must take into account
in its construction of the CISG’s provisions.62 Beyond this, the
directive does not specify how the decisions of other courts are to
be taken into account, nor does it seemingly demand that the
reasoning of other courts be followed.
Courts and commentators construe Article 7(1)’s directive to
require the CISG to be interpreted “autonomously,” not
nationalistically.63
An autonomous interpretation mandates
Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001); Clayton P. Gillette, LockIn Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813 (1998).
60 See CISG, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
61 CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(1).
62 See Officine Maraldi S.p.A. v. Intessa BCI S.p.A. et. al., CISG-online case no.
1780, Tribunale di Forli (It.) (July 12, 2002).
63 See Medical Marketing Int’l v. Int’l Medico Scientifica, S.R.L., 1999 WL 311945,
at *2 (E.D. La. 1999); SO.M.AGRI s.a.s. v. Erzeugerorganisation Marchfeldgemüse
GmbH & Co. KG, CISG-online case no. 819, Tribunale di Padova (It.) (Feb. 25, 2004);
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construing the CISG’s provisions independently of domestic law. It
does not allow a court to rely on the meaning given to particular
terms by domestic law, even if the specific CISG provision and its
domestic law counterpart are expressed in the same words. The
apparent thought is that an interpretation of the CISG based on
notions borrowed from domestic law will not be favored by
tribunals in other ratifying countries. A uniform interpretation is
more likely to result when courts construe the CISG’s provisions
independently of domestic law.
The uniformity directive is a distinct interpretive tool of
international commercial conventions, with its own justification.
Text and legislative intent, for instance, are methods that provide
evidence of the meaning of the text’s provisions. For their part,
canons of construction, whether linguistic or substantive, arguably
reflect the presumptive legislative intent with respect to the text’s
meaning.64 By contrast, uniformity is an interpretive method that
favors a construction of a text (other things being equal) because
other courts have favored the same construction. The fact that other
courts have converged on a construction is a reason to adopt it too.
Nonetheless, the construction may not implement legislative intent
or be best supported by the text.
This difference in result is unsurprising given the directive’s
distinct rationale. UNCITRAL conventions are applied by national
courts in ratifying countries. There is therefore the potential for
divergent judicial interpretations of the same provisions. The
injunction to have a regard for uniformity helps coordinate
interpretations by tribunals so that they converge on a construction
of relevant provisions.65 This convergence in interpretation among
tribunals benefits parties subject the UNCITRAL’s products by
FRANCO FERRARI, CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: APPLICABILITY
AND APPLICATIONS OF THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS SALES CONVENTIONS 12 (2d ed. 2012);
INGEBORG SCHWENZER & PASCAL HACHEM, Article 7, in SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER:
COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS 119 (I. Schwenzer ed., 4th ed. 2016); C.M. BIANCA & M.J. BONELL, Article 7, in
COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION
65, 75 (C.M. Bianca & M.J. Bonell eds., 1987).
64 See Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 348, 383 (2005).
65 For a survey of how tribunals have applied the uniformity directive under the
CISG, see CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & STEVEN D. WALT, THE INTERNATIONAL SALES
CONTRACT: 40 YEARS OF THE CISG 270 (F. Benatti, S.A. Garcia-Long & F. Vigliano eds.,
2022). The Uniform Commercial Code, enacted as part of state law, contains a uniformity
directive. See U.C.C. § 1-301(a) (2017).
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enabling them to forecast with some confidence how provisions
applicable to their transactions will be construed by national courts
and arbitral tribunals. By comparison, the rationale for relying on
the text is accuracy. The meaning of its terms accurately reflects
their ordinary meaning and presumptively reflects the meaning
intended by the legislature. The justification of the uniformity
directive is convergence of interpretations, not accuracy.
B. The Uniformity Directive Among the Mix of Interpretive
Methods
As noted, the ratification of an international commercial
convention incorporates the uniformity directive into national law.
As part of that convention, the directive is an interpretive method
applicable to the ratified convention. Because the uniformity
directive is mandatory, a court in the ratifying country cannot
construe the convention without at least taking uniformity into
account. At the same time, the directive does not displace other
interpretive methods applicable to treaties generally, as part of
national law. Thus, these methods continue to be applicable to
construe the convention. In short, the directive is a mandatory but
not exclusive interpretive method.
1. Mandatory application. The uniformity directive is a
mandatory interpretive method (“regard is to be had . . . to the need
for uniformity”66). It requires courts in a ratifying country, in
interpreting the convention, to consider the impact of a proposed
construction of the convention on uniformity in the convention’s
interpretation. Thus, a court whose interpretation relies only on
interpretive methods reflected in the VCLT’s rules of interpretation,
without taking uniformity in account, violates the directive. It
breaches the obligation that Article 7(1) of the CISG, and
comparable provisions of other UNCITRAL conventions, impose
on tribunals interpreting transnational law. This is true even if the
court interprets transnational law in accordance with the VCLT’s
rules of interpretation.67
Commentators label the tendency of courts to interpret
transnational law through the lens of domestic law notions the

66
67

See id.
See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.

2022

TRANSNATIONAL LAW & TREATY INTERPRETATION

399

“homeward trend.”68
The charge sticks only because the
interpretive practice criticized does not take uniformity into
account. The criticism has been made with respect to interpretations
of the CISG’s substantive provisions.69 But the charge has a more
general application, extending to the CISG’s interpretive provisions
too. It applies also to constructions of transnational law that rely
only on either domestic law interpretive rules or the VCLT’s rules
of interpretation. In both instances the constructions fail to take
uniformity into account. As a result, constructions that ignore the
uniformity directive are instances of the “homeward trend.”
Gainsford v. Tannenbaum,70 decided by an Australian appellate
court, is an instance of the “homeward trend” in interpretation. The
case involved the interpretation of the UNCITRAL Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvency (“Model Law”),71 enacted into Australian
law as the Cross-Border Insolvency Act (“Cross-Border Act” or
“Act”).72 Under the Model Law and Cross-Border Act, Australian
courts generally must recognize a foreign insolvency proceeding if
certain specified conditions are met. A foreign proceeding must be
recognized as a foreign main proceeding if the proceeding takes
place in the country in which the debtor has its center of main
interests. If the foreign proceeding takes place in a country in which
the debtor does not have its center of main interests, the proceeding
must be recognized as a foreign non-main proceeding. More
extensive relief is available if the foreign proceeding is a main rather
than non-main proceeding.
In Gainsford, recognition of an insolvency proceeding initiated
68 See Franco Ferrari, Homeward Trend and Lex Forism Despite Uniform Sales Law,
15 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COMM. L. & ARB. 15, 15 (2009); John Honnold, The Sales
Convention In Action--Uniform International Words: Uniform Application?, 8 J. L. &
COMM. 207, 208 (1988); Michael F. Sturley, International Uniform Law in National
Courts: The Influence of Domestic Law in Conflicts of Interpretation, 27 VA. J. INT’L L.
729 (1987).
69 See, e.g., Joseph Lookofsky & Harry Flechtner, Nominating Manfred Foberich:
The Worst CISG Decision in 25 Years?, 9 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COMM. L. & ARB. 199
(2005); Larry A. DiMatteo et al., The Interpretive Turn in International Sales Law: An
Analysis of Fifteen Years of CISG Jurisprudence, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 299, 400
(2004); Francesco G. Mazzotta, Why Do Some American Courts Fail to Get it Right?, 3
LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 85 (2005).
70 See Gainsford v. Tannenbaum, [2012] FCA 904 (Austl.) [hereinafter Gainsford].
71 See UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency with Guide to
Enactment and Interpretation, art. 15(3) (2014) [hereinafter Model Law].
72 Cross-Border Insolvency Act 2008 (Cth) (Austl.) [hereinafter Cross-Border Act].
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in South Africa against an individual debtor was sought in Australia.
The debtor had left South Africa and settled in Australia before the
South African bankruptcy proceeding was commenced. Among
other issues, the Federal Court had to determine whether the South
African insolvency proceeding was a foreign main proceeding or a
foreign non-main proceeding. Under the Cross-Border Act there is
a presumption that, absent contrary proof, the individual debtor’s
center of main interests is her habitual residence.73 However,
neither the Act nor the Model Law define “habitual residence.” In
addition, under the Act a foreign non-main proceeding takes place
where the individual debtor has an “establishment.”74 Construing
these terms, the Gainsford court concluded that neither the debtor’s
center of main interests nor his establishment was in South Africa.
To construe the term “habitual residence,” the court relied on
Australian principles of statutory construction.75 Its reliance is
misplaced. To be sure, the Model Law is a template for adoption as
domestic law, not a proposal for a treaty,76 and the Cross-Border
Act therefore is a piece of ordinary domestic legislation. As such,
Australian principles of statutory interpretation govern the Act’s
construction. However, Article 8 of the Act states a rule of
interpretation that requires regard for uniformity in the
interpretation of the Act.77 This rule is specific to the Act; it is not
among domestic principles of construction that apply to statutes
generally. In construing the term “habitual residence” through the
lens of Australian principles of statutory interpretation, the court
follows the “homeward trend” in the interpretation of the Act.
The Gainsford court hedges its bet by finding, alternatively, that
these principles allow reliance on international conventions to
inform the meaning of the term under the Act. Determining that
“habitual residence” had a settled meaning there, the court elected
to construe the term in the same way for purposes of the Act.78 But
the question is not whether Australian principles of statutory

73

See Cross-Border Act, supra note 72, § 16(3); Model Law, supra note 71, art.

16(3).
74 See Cross-Border Act, supra note 72, §§ 2(f), 17(2)(b); Model Law, supra note
71, arts. 2(f) & 17(2)(b).
75 See Gainsford, supra note 70, at [37].
76 See CISG, supra note 1.
77 See Cross-Border Act, supra note 72, art. 8.
78 See Gainsford, supra note 70, at [40]-[41].
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interpretation allow recourse to international conventions. Under
the terms of the Act, it must be whether the Act’s uniformity
directive allows reliance on these international instruments to
construe the meaning of the Act’s terms.
The court’s route to its construction may or may not comply
with Article 8’s uniformity directive, depending on its
interpretation. Article 8 of the Model Law and the Cross-Border
Act both provide that “[i]n the interpretation of this Law, regard is
to be had to its international origin and the need to promote
uniformity in its application.” If “international origin” refers to the
particular law being interpreted, the required source of
interpretation is law-specific. In this case, Article 8’s mandate
requires the court to take into account other courts’ constructions of
“habitual residence” only under the Model Law, as incorporated
into the domestic law of other nations. Judicial constructions of the
term “habitual residence” as part of conventions therefore are
irrelevant under Article 8. In inquiring into the interpretation of a
term in treaties or domestic legislation other than legislation
implementing the Model Law, the court would fail to follow Article
8’s uniformity directive. However, if “international origin” in
Article 8 refers to international instruments generally, the required
source of interpretation is potentially all laws with an international
basis. In this case, the court’s reliance on the meaning of “habitual
residence” in treaties would not violate Article 8’s uniformity
directive. Ultimately, the better understanding of Article 8’s
relevant language probably depends on which construction more
effectively harmonizes applications of the Model Law, as adopted
in domestic legislation.
2. Non-displacing effect. The uniformity directive supplements
rather than displaces the VCLT’s rules of treaty interpretation
applicable to international commercial conventions.
Three
considerations show that the directive has this limited effect. First,
the terms of the uniformity directive prescribe an interpretive
method rather than displacing other interpretive methods in force.
For instance, the CISG’s uniformity directive requires that in the
interpretation of the CISG “regard be had” to uniformity.79 The
directive in other international commercial conventions contains the
same relevant language.
To require that “regard be had” to uniformity obligates a court
79

See CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(1).
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to take uniformity into account in the process of interpretation.
However, the requirement does not prevent the court from relying
on other interpretive methods in force as well. Nor does it conflict
with other interpretive methods that applicable rules of
interpretation require courts to use. Article 31(1) of the VCLT
requires a treaty to be interpreted in accordance with the ordinary
meaning of the treaty’s terms, their context and object or purpose.80
The uniformity directive, when applicable, adds a method to these
interpretive methods. Nonetheless, a court still can interpret an
international commercial convention in accordance with these
interpretive methods while also taking uniformity into account.
This is because, taken together, neither the VCLT’s rules of
interpretation nor the directive are exclusive interpretive methods.
Thus, the addition of the uniformity directive does not preempt the
interpretive methods required by the VCLT.
Second, international commercial conventions containing the
uniformity directive have a limited scope. They do not address
procedural rules such as rules of evidence, standards of proof,
statutes of limitation and arguably attorneys’ fees.81 These matters
instead are left to the applicable national law of the forum. In
addition, international commercial conventions expressly omit
provisions on a range of substantive issues likely to arise in
commercial contexts, such as the validity of contracts or application
of tort law.82 Their limited scope suggests that uniformity is not the
only concern of transnational law. Other concerns, such as the
provision of efficient default terms, arguably are important too.83 If
so, the benefits of a uniform construction must be taken into account
in interpretation along with other factors, including the ordinary
meaning of terms of transnational law or their purpose. As a result,
the inclusion of the directive in a treaty with limited scope does not
signal that uniformity is the sole method for interpreting
transnational law. The safer inference from the transnational law’s
limited scope is that, unlike some other treaties, uniformity is an
80

See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
See generally Clayton P. Gillette & Steven D. Walt, Judicial Refusal to Apply
Treaty Law: Domestic Law Limitations on the CISG’s Application, 22 UNIF. L. REV. 452,
482-483 (2017).
82 See, e.g., CISG, supra note 1, arts. 4(a),(b), 5.
83 The Preamble to the CISG, for example, recites the consideration that “the
development of international trade on the basis of . . . mutual benefit is an important
element . . . .” See id.
81
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additional interpretive requirement.
Third, the view that the uniformity directive displaces other
interpretive methods is implausible. Treaties that have just become
effective initially lack judicial interpretations; a convergence in
interpretation can occur only after a series of cases construing its
terms.84 The interpretation in the initial cases in the series, by
necessity, must be made in an uncoordinated fashion. But if the
uniformity directive displaces other methods of interpretation in
force, there are no means of interpreting the treaty’s terms in these
cases. This is unlikely. Thus, rather than displacing other
interpretive methods, the application of the directive presupposes
that they remain in force.
The displacement of interpretive methods likely also frustrates
the aim of textual interpretation. Scholars disagree about this aim.
Some view the point of textual interpretation to be to understand the
semantic meaning conveyed by an act of communication, such as a
text. Other scholars view the aim of interpretation to be to
understand the linguistic meaning the drafters intend to convey in
the text.85 Whichever view is correct, methods of interpretation
allow inferences about the semantic meaning of the text or
communicative intent conveyed by it. They ease the burden of
determining the semantic meaning of the text or the information the
drafter’s intent adds to that meaning. The displacement of other
interpretive methods by the uniformity directive would leave
uniformity as the sole basis upon which to make inferences about
semantic meaning or communicative intent. By itself, uniformity is
unlikely to be a reliable basis for drawing inferences about them.
The ordinary meaning of the text or its purpose is a more reliable
guide to the text’s semantic meaning or the communicative intent of
its authors. Thus, reliance on the uniformity directive alone will not
best accomplish the aim of interpretation.

84 The interpretation of several of the provisions of the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards might be an example. For instance, the
settled understanding of Article II(3), which allows exceptions to the enforcement of
arbitral awards, is that the exceptions refer to contract defenses to enforcement, not to
public policy considerations. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Arbitral Awards, United Nations, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
85 See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text; Mark Greenberg, Legislation as
Communication? Legal Interpretation and the Study of Linguistic Communication, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 217, 247 (A. Marmor & S.
Soames eds., 2011).
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C. The Increased Difficulty of Interpretation
The uniformity directive adds an interpretive method to the
VCLT’s rules of interpretation governing the construction of
transnational law. As applied, Article 31(1) of the VCLT requires
the interpretation of an international commercial convention to be
in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the convention’s terms
taking into account their context and the convention’s object or
purpose. These different sources reflect different methods of
interpretation: the conventional meaning of the convention’s terms,
their place within the convention as a whole, and the end the parties
intend the convention to accomplish. The mandate that the
construction of transnational law take into account uniformity in
interpretation is a separate requirement. Article 31(1) requires that
the meaning of the convention’s terms be interpreted on the basis of
specified methods. By comparison, the uniformity directive
requires that consideration be given to whether an interpretation
harmonizes with the interpretations of other tribunals.
Because Article 31(1)’s interpretive methods are separate from
the uniformity directive, an interpretation of transnational law must
be based on both. The interpretation must be in accordance with
ordinary meaning of relevant terms, context, and the transnational
law’s purpose, in addition to considering the harmonization of the
interpretation with the interpretations of other tribunals. As noted
above,86 Article 31(1)’s rule of interpretation does not give priority
to any of the interpretative methods it prescribes. Instead, the rule
describes a plurality of methods each of which is on par with the
others. To these methods the uniformity directive adds the
requirement that an interpretation take uniformity into account. For
its part, the directive does not give priority to uniformity over other
interpretive methods or a particular weight with respect these
methods. Thus, taken together, Article 31(1) and the uniformity
directive prescribe an unstructured set of methods on which an
interpretation of transnational law must be based.
The point to note is that treaty interpretation is difficult under
Article 31(1)’s rule of interpretation. This is because the Article
requires an interpretation to take into account ordinary meaning,
context, and purpose without prescribing how this is be done. The
Article requires only that the interpretation be based on the ordinary

86

See Linderfalk, supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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meaning of the treaty’s terms “in light of” context and the treaty’s
object or purpose. It therefore leaves to the court’s discretion how
the different interpretive methods are combined in a particular case.
The need to combine different interpretive methods, with no
instruction as to how to do so, makes it hard to know whether the
methods are being combined correctly.
In addition, the uniformity directive by itself makes the
interpretation of transnational law more difficult. As a treaty, its
interpretation must rely on Article 31(1)’s unstructured set of
interpretive methods. To this the uniformity directive adds an
imprecise and unstructured mandate. The mandate is imprecise
because it does not prescribe how much importance uniformity must
have in a construction. As far as the directive goes, a court can have
“regard” for uniformity even if it ultimately construes transnational
law non-uniformly. Among all required sources of interpretation,
uniformity need not be a paramount consideration in the court’s
construction. The directive also is unstructured in that it says
nothing about how uniformity is to be combined with Article
31(1)’s interpretive methods. The addition of an imprecise and
unstructured interpretive method to interpretive methods, which
themselves are difficult to apply, makes the construction of
transnational law even harder than the interpretation of other
treaties.
The directive also prevents the use of information that otherwise
can help resolve obscurities in treaty provisions. For instance, the
pari materia canon of construction allows the interpretation of
obscure statutory provisions in light of other statutes governing
similar subject matters.87 In this way information about the meaning
of a provision in another statute can be used to clarify the meaning
of the terms in a separate statute. As applied, the canon permits the

87 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ
STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 117-18 (2016); REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION
AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 233 (1975). For reliance on the pari materia canon in the
interpretation of investment treaties, see STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION
OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 275 (2009); Adrian M. Johnston & Michael J.
Trebilcock, Fragmentation in International Trade Law: Insights from the Global
Investment Regime, 12 WORLD TRADE REV. 621, 630 (2013). For criticism of the practice,
see Martins Paparinskis, Sources of Law and Arbitral Interpretation of Pari Materia
Investment Protections Rules, in THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL COURTS
AND THE (DE)FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 87, 90 (O.K. Fauchald & A.
Nollkaemper eds., 2012).
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construction of an undefined term according to the definition of the
same term in a comparable statute.88 However, by requiring that the
interpretations of transnational law be independent of domestic law,
the uniformity directive bars reliance on comparable domestic
statutes to inform the meaning of transnational law’s provisions.89
The directive therefore excludes information that can make the
treaty’s application more manageable. The point is not that the
incorporation of the uniformity directive into transnational law is a
bad idea. It is only that the directive can make it more difficult to
know whether transnational law is being construed correctly.
As a result, the introduction of the uniformity directive makes
the outcome of interpretations of transnational law more
unpredictable. Article 31(1)’s rule of interpretation is uncertain in
its application, as it mandates use of a plurality of interpretive
methods with no priority or organizing principle. The addition of
the directive to other required interpretive methods expands the set
of methods on which an interpretation must be based. Because none
of these methods have priority or more weight than others, neither
the VCLT nor transnational law dictate how they are to be
combined. Accordingly, in interpreting a provision, courts retain
the discretion as to how the uniformity directive is employed
together with other methods. By adding the uniformity directive,
transnational law increases their discretion to construe that law. As
a result, it makes a court’s interpretation based on required
interpretive methods harder to forecast.
The increased difficulty of treaty interpretation creates a
familiar political problem. As with other laws, the entitlements
identified by transnational law are backed by force, at least
domestically. Legal coercion is legitimately threatened or exercised
88 Bankruptcy courts, for example, sometimes rely on the definition of good faith
under the Uniform Commercial Code into the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., In re Ellingsen
MacLean Oil Co., 834 F.2d 599, 605 (6th Cir. 1987) (noting that “the definition most often
used [to define the term “good faith”] is that of the Uniform Commercial Code . . . “); In
re Teleservices Group, Inc., 444 B.R. 767 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011) (noting that the
Uniform Commercial Code definition of good faith informs the meaning of good faith
under Bankruptcy Code § 364(e)).
89 See supra note 48 and accompanying text; Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528
F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting that the directive might not bar reliance on the definition
of the same term in comparable treaties, as the reliance tends to harmonize interpretations).
But see supra note 83 and accompanying text (offering that comparable treaties leave terms
undefined, barring reliance on domestic law definitions excludes information that can
make the undefined terms less obscure).
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only if those subject to coercion have an opportunity to know in
advance that their conduct is proscribed.90 This is the requirement
that they receive fair notice.
However, the difficulty of
interpretation described above threatens the legitimacy of
transnational law. A plurality of interpretive methods, with no
guidance as to how to combine them, makes it impossible to forecast
how transnational law sometimes will be interpreted, based on those
methods alone. As a result, transnational law sometimes will not be
known to those whose legal entitlements are identified by it. Unless
the content of transnational law is discoverable independently of
legally operative interpretive methods, enforcement of transnational
law is illegitimate.
To be sure, pluralism in decision making sometimes is
unobjectionable (and unavoidable). In everyday life we sometimes
make difficult decisions about what to do based on different sorts of
considerations. In making these decisions we take into account a
range of concerns, including prudential, moral and aesthetic
considerations, without an algorithm or standard for doing so. There
is ostensibly nothing objectionable about making ordinary practical
decisions in this way. But the interpretation of transnational law is
different. An interpretation of an international commercial law
treaty describes legal entitlements backed by force. Unlike a purely
personal decision, the construction ultimately has consequences for
others: it gives them rights or imposes obligations backed by
sanctions. Without fair notice about how transnational law will be
interpreted, its enforcement is problematic.
D. Two Illustrations
The expanded set of required interpretive methods helps explain
the diverse judicial constructions of certain provisions of

90 Cf. Paul Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154
PA. L. REV. 335, 336 (2005) (clarifying that a principle of legality requires that criminal
liability and punishment be based on prior legislative enactment stated with “precision and
clarity”); Christopher Kurtz, Secret Law and the Value of Publicity, 22 RATIO JUR. 197,
211 (2009) (contending that publicity is “part of what makes law law”); LON FULLER,
MORALITY OF LAW 49-51 (1964) (noting the rule of law requirement that laws be generally
available to those subject to them); Joseph Raz, The Politics of the Rule of Law, in ESSAYS
IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE LAW AND MORALITY OF POLITICS 370, 371 (rev. ed.
1996) (describing a bureaucratic conception of rule of law requiring that laws be publicly
and clearly stated); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 114 (1979) (noting the principle
that laws should be open, adequately publicized, and derivable from the rule of law).
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transnational law. If applicable rules of interpretation leave courts
with broad discretion to employ different interpretive methods
together, courts are able to interpret the same provisions very
differently. To be sure, other explanations of the diversity in
interpretations are possible. Most notably, different interpretations
could result from a reliance on national law notions, in violation of
the uniformity directive. Or the disparate results might be a
temporary phenomenon, the consequence of an initial failure to
harmonize interpretations of novel law. The introduction of the
uniformity directive explains disparate judicial constructions of
transnational law differently.
It predicts disparate judicial
interpretations even if courts do not rely on notions borrowed from
national law. Because transnational law leaves courts with broad
interpretive discretion, the disparity in interpretations potentially is
persistent, not the temporary result of construing novel law. The
role of the uniformity directive in disparate interpretations is
illustrated by the judicial construction of two provisions of
transnational law.
1. Revocation of an offer. The CISG’s rules of contract
formation are based on offer and acceptance. An offer that recites
a period within which it can be accepted presents an issue which the
CISG leaves unresolved. Under Article 16(2)(a), an offer cannot be
revoked “if it indicates, whether by stating a fixed time for
acceptance or otherwise, that is irrevocable.”91 This provision is
open to two different interpretations as to when an offer “indicates”
that it is irrevocable. One is that an offer is irrevocable for the
period stated if it fixes a period for acceptance. This understanding
is consistent with the rules in civil law systems, which hold that
setting a time after which the period for acceptance expires indicates
that the offer is irrevocable until that time. A different interpretation
is that the offer is open until the stated time expires but can be
effectively revoked prior to that time. Under Article 16(1), an offer
is effectively revoked if the revocation reaches the offeree before
the offeree has dispatched an acceptance. This understanding fits
with the common law rule, which provides that the inclusion of a
fixed time after which the offer lapses does not make the offer
irrevocable prior to that time.
The problem is that the CISG does not clarify when an offer
indicates by its terms that it is irrevocable. The CISG’s drafters
91

See CISG, supra note 1, art. 16(2)(a).
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easily could have avoided the ambiguity in Article 16(2)(a) by
supplying suitably clarifying language. They instead intentionally
choose not to do so.92 A proposed amendment to Article 16(2)(a)
provided that the stating of a fixed time for acceptance does not by
itself indicate that the offer is irrevocable.93 The amendment was
rejected.94 By rejecting the amendment, the delegates to the 1980
Vienna Conference decided to leave Article 16(2)(a)’s relevant
language ambiguous. The result is a sort of diplomatic compromise
in which ambiguity is the price of the delegates’ agreement on the
CISG’s text.
In these circumstances the uniformity directive does not favor a
particular construction of Article 16(2)(a). Because there are no
decisions construing the Article, an interpretation cannot take into
account other courts’ constructions. Just as important, there are no
factors that give a particular interpretation salience, so that other
courts could be expected to converge around it. The plain language
of the Article does not dictate when an offer’s terms “indicate” that
the offer is irrevocable. Civil lawyers generally understand the
fixing of a time period for acceptance to indicate that the offer is
irrevocable, while common lawyers understand the offer as
revocable while indicating that it is subject to lapse.
The impact of a particular interpretation on contracting costs
also will not be apparent to an interpreting court. The irrevocability
of an offer has two effects. It raises the offeror’s cost of making the
offer, as it commits the offeror to holding the offer open for a fixed
period. At the same time, the irrevocability of the offer increases
the value of the offer to the offeree, as the offer’s continued
effectiveness gives the offeree an option on the uncertain value of
the subject matter of the offer over time. In comparison, the
revocability of an offer reduces the offeror’s cost of making the
offer, because the offeror can retract an offer that is no longer in its
interest to keep open. The revocability of the offer also reduces the
offer’s value to the offeree, as it does not have an option on the value

92 See PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, UNIFORM SALES LAW 51-52 (1986); Gyula Eorsi, A
Propos the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 31
AM. J. COMP. L. 333, 354-55 (1983).
93 See 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/C1/L.48 (United
Kingdom proposal).
94 See 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, Report of the First Committee, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.97/L1.
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of the subject matter of the offer. Thus, the direction of the impacts
on the offeror and offeree differ according to whether the offer is
irrevocable or revocable. The efficient interpretation of an offer that
fixes a time period for acceptance optimally reduces the net cost of
making the offer. Although the net cost of making an offer
revocable or irrevocable might be gauged, courts are not in a
position to make the calculation reliably. As a result, the efficiency
of interpreting an offer with a fixed period for acceptance as
irrevocable or revocable cannot inform a court’s interpretation of
Article 16(2)(a).
Absent salient factors that favor a particular interpretation, the
mandate to uniformity will not induce courts to settle on a particular
interpretation. They will have disparate interpretations of the
relevant language of Article 16(2)(a). The experience of the
delegates at the 1980 Vienna Conference is consistent with this
prediction.95
2. Exemption From Performance. Almost all legal systems
allow parties to deviate from their contractual obligations without
liability under prescribed conditions when circumstances
substantially change between the conclusion of the contract and the
time the contract is to be performed. Article 79 of the CISG, when
it applies, excuses a party’s performance under international
contracts for the sales of goods. The Article exempts the buyer or
seller from liability for damages for its failure to perform its
obligations if the party can prove that the conditions described in
the Article are satisfied. Specifically, the party seeking the
exemption must demonstrate three things: (1) its failure to perform
was due to an impediment beyond its control, (2) it could not
reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into account
at the conclusion of the contract, and (3) the party could not
reasonably have avoided the impediment or its consequences once
the impediment occurred.96
Excuse from performance implicates issues concerning the
assumption of risk, foreseeability and the consequences of
intervening events. Article 79(1)’s conditions address them in terms
peculiar to the CISG. The terms “impediment,” “control” and
95 See 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, Analysis of Comments and Proposals by
Governments and International Organizations, art. 16 at ¶¶ 1, 5 & 6, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.97/9.
96 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1).
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“avoid” are not found in national law. The choice of novel
terminology is deliberate. The CISG’s drafters wanted the
circumstances in which the CISG excused performance to be
independent of national law doctrines. To discourage the
construction of Article 79 through terms borrowed from domestic
law, the Article uses terms unfamiliar to domestic law. Even
without Article 79’s special terminology, an implication of Article
7(1)’s uniformity directive bars the interpretation of Article 79’s
conditions based on the excuse doctrine of national law. Because
relevant national law is diverse, an interpretation based on national
law produces disparate constructions of these conditions. The
mandate of uniformity therefore does not allow national law notions
as a source of interpretation.
The trouble is that Article 79 leaves its crucial terms undefined.
This presents several difficulties of interpretation. One involves
the meaning of “impediment” under Article 79(1). The question
here is what sort of intervening events count as impediments to
performance. Although natural disasters, acts of terrorism,
epidemics or prohibitory state regulations can prevent performance,
“impediment” does not appear to be limited to cases in which
performance is impossible. At the same time, not every event that
affects performance counts as an impediment. The prevailing view
counts as impediments events that make performance more
expensive or less valuable to the performing party. The obvious
problem is to determine the threshold at which increased expense or
diminished value becomes an impediment. An increase in the cost
of performing an obligation, without more, does not constitute an
impediment to performance.97 As a result, courts have the familiar
interpretive task of determining the extent of the cost increase that
impedes performance under Article 79(1).
None of the standard resources of interpretation help make the

97 See Text of Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
Approved by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, art. 65 (at ¶ 10),
U.N. Doc A/CONF.97/5 (1979) (noting the buyer’s insolvency probably is not an
impediment to its payment of the contract price); Vital Berry Marketing v. Dirafrost Frozen
Fruit Industry NV, CISG-online case no. 371, Rechtbank van Koophandel Hasselt
[Commercial Court Hasselt] (Belg.) (May 2, 1995) (noting that a significant drop in market
price does not exempt the buyer from payment); Iron Molybdenum Case, CISG-online
case no. 261, Oberlandesgericht Hamburg [OLG] [Court of Appeals Hamburg] (Ger.)
(Feb. 28, 1997) (finding that a 300% increase in the commodity the seller promised its
buyer does not exempt the seller’s performance).
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notion of an impediment more determinate. Diplomatic history
does not clarify the notion.98 For their part, excuse doctrines of
domestic law cannot inform an understanding of “impediment,” for
two reasons. First, because the term is unfamiliar to domestic law,
inferences from the judicial construction of domestic law excuse
doctrine to Article 79(1)’s impediment requirement are unsafe.
Second, an implication of the CISG’s uniformity directive mandates
that Article 79 be interpreted independently of domestic law.99
Thus, a construction of the impediment requirement cannot rely on
domestic law excuse doctrine, even if that law contains a
comparable requirement. This leaves the uniformity directive itself:
as applied, the mandate that an interpretation of the impediment
requirement have regard for uniformity in the application of the
requirement. The directive gives a court a reason to follow an
interpretation of the requirement other courts have converged on.
However, case law does not reveal a shared application of
“impediment,” particularly with respect to the increases in the cost
of performance. Perhaps in response to the difficulty in construing
“impediment,” courts interpreting Article 79(1) often avoid
addressing the impediment requirement, instead denying a claimed
exemption on other grounds.100
The difficulty of construing “impediment” arises in connection
with claims to financial hardship. Some legal systems permit a
court to order the parties to renegotiate specific contract terms when
performance becomes excessively onerous as a result of events that
fundamentally alter the equilibrium of the contract.101
If
renegotiation is unsuccessful, the court can terminate the contract or
modify its terms. An initial question is whether Article 79 governs

98 See CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 7: Exemption of Liability for Damages
Under Article 79 of the CISG ¶¶ 27-29, CISG ADVISORY COUNCIL (2007),
http://www.cisgac.com/cisgac-opinion-no7/ [https://perma.cc/LG9E-R6Q5].
99 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. For an instance of the reliance on
domestic law excuse doctrine in the interpretation of Article 79, see Raw Materials, Inc.
v. Manfred Forberich GmbH & Co., 54 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 878 (N.D. Ill. 2004), criticized
in Lookofsky & Flechtner, supra note 69.
100 For a survey of the cases, see UNCITRAL Digest of Case Law on the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: 2016 Edition 376 at
¶ 12 (2016), available at: https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/mediadocuments/uncitral/en/cisg_digest_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KKK-UPNB].
101 See STEVEN D. WALT, SALES LAW: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 291 (3d ed.
2020).
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hardship. The Article is unclear as to whether hardship counts as an
impediment.102 If it does, Article 79 excuses a party’s performance
when events make performance excessively onerous, where the
party could not reasonably have taken them into account or avoided
or overcome the events or their consequences. Although several
courts have found that Article 79 does not govern hardship,103
almost all other decisions conclude that hardship falls within Article
79’s scope.104
Given the consensus view of Article 79’s scope in the courts,
the CISG’s uniformity directive argues in favor of counting
hardship as an impediment. However, the question remains as to
when intervening events create hardship. In particular, in the case
of an increase in the cost of performance, how much of an increase
makes performance excessively onerous? To answer the question,
a required threshold of cost increase must be specified. Even if
tribunals share the view that Article 79 governs hardship, they might
disagree as to this required threshold. Case law does not reveal
agreement on the extent of a cost increase that constitutes an
impediment to performance. Although an impediment has been
found when the price of inputs increased by 70%,105 most decisions
conclude that a 100% increase does not suffice.106 Even a 300%
102 See CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & STEVEN D. WALT, THE UN CONVENTION ON
CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 304-05 (2d
ed. 2016).
103 See, e.g., Scafom International BV & Orion Metal BVBA v. Exma CPI SA, CISGonline case no. 1106, Rechtbank van Koophandel Tongeren [Commercial Court Tongeren]
(Belg.) (Jan. 25, 2005); Nuova Fucinati S.p.A. v. Fondmetall International A.B., CISGonline case no. 102, Tribunale di Monza (It.) (Jan. 14, 1993).
104 See, e.g., Vital Berry Marketing v. Dirafrost Frozen Fruit Industry NV, CISGonline case no. 371, Rechtbank van Koophandel Hasselt [Commercial Court Hasselt]
(Belg.) (May 2, 1995); Romay AG v. Behr France S.a.r.l., CISG-online case no. 694, Cour
d’Appel de Colmar [CA] [Court of Appeal Colmar] (Fr.) (June 12, 2001); Scafom
International BV v. Lorraine Tubes S.A.S., CISG-online case no. 1963, Hof van Cassatie
van Belgie [Belgian Supreme Court] (Belg.) (June 19, 2009); Steel Rope Case, CISGonline case no. 436, Arbitration Court at the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and
Industry (Bulg.) (Feb. 12, 1998). Cf. CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 20: Hardship
Under the CISG 13 (at ¶ 2.2), CISG ADVISORY COUNCIL (2020), http://cisgac.com/opinionno20-hardship-under-the-cisg/ (finding that courts and arbitral decisions “more or less
unanimously” accept that Article 79 governs hardship).
105 See Scafom International BV v. Lorraine Tubes S.A.S., CISG-online case no.
1963, Hof van Cassatie van Belgie [Belgian Supreme Court] (Belg.) (June 19, 2009).
106 See CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 20, supra note 104, at Annex 1 (collecting
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increase in price has been found not to be impediment.107 No case
to date has set a required threshold of cost increase for an
impediment, even as a presumption. Going beyond the case law,
some scholars recommend a threshold of 100%.108 Because case
law has not settled on the required threshold for an impediment,
uniformity in application does not provide a reason for favoring a
particular threshold of cost increase.
Conclusion
The theoretical literature on the harmonization of transnational
law asks whether uniformity in interpretation is a good idea, while
the descriptive literature assumes that it is a worthwhile goal.109
This paper asks a different question: Even if uniformity in
interpretation is a worthwhile goal, are existing interpretive
methods an obstacle to achieving it? Rules of treaty interpretation
require use of a variety of different methods to determine the
meaning of a treaty’s provisions. Because these methods have no
underlying principle or priority for their application in combination,
courts are left with discretion in construing treaties. Treaty
interpretation is hard not because courts have broad discretion in
interpretation. Rather, it is hard because applicable rules of
interpretation do not specify how interpretive methods are to be
used together in exercising discretion.
For its part, transnational law’s uniformity directive is similarly
unstructured. A mandate merely to take uniformity into account in
interpretation says nothing about how harmonization ought to figure
cases); Ingeborg Schwenzer, Force Majeure and Hardship in International Sales
Contracts, 39 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 709, 716 (2008) (surveying decisions up
to 2008).
107 See Iron Molybdenum Case, CISG-online case no. 261, Oberlandesgericht
Hamburg [OLG] [Court of Appeals Hamburg] (Ger.) (Feb. 28, 1997).
108 See CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 20, supra note 104, ¶ 7.2; Ingeborg
Schwenzer & Edgardo Munoz, Duty to Renegotiate and Contract Adaptation in the Case
of Hardship, 24 UNIF. L. REV. 149, 156 (2019).
109 For literature investigating whether uniformity in law generally is a worthwhile
goal, see David W. Leebron, Claims of Harmonization: A Theoretical Framework, 17
CAN. BUS. L. J. 63, 75-91 (1996); Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Koyabashi, An Economic
Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (1996); Clayton P. Gillette &
Steven D. Walt, Uniformity and Diversity in Payments Systems, 83 CHI-KENT L. REV. 499
(2008). For an example of the assumption that uniformity in laws is worthwhile, see A
Guide to UNCITRAL, supra note 1, at 2 (describing UNCITRAL’s mandate as including
the preparation or promotion of uniform law as well as their uniform interpretation).
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in combination with other applicable interpretive methods. By
introducing an interpretive method that supplements methods
otherwise applicable to treaties, transnational law’s uniformity
directive makes interpretation of international commercial
conventions even more difficult. If uniformity in the interpretation
of transnational law is achieved, it is the result of non-legal factors
driving interpretations.
Transnational law’s uniformity directive is intended to help
harmonize interpretations of international commercial conventions
by national courts. However, its impact on interpretation is
ambiguous. On the one hand, as an independent requirement, the
mandate to take uniformity into account encourages constructions
that harmonize applications of transnational law. On the other hand,
the uniformity directive is one among other required interpretive
methods. Its addition therefore expands the methods on which
courts must rely. Courts must interpret provisions of transnational
law based on ordinary meaning, context and purpose as well as
uniformity. Without a prescribed way of combining them,
applicable rules of interpretation leave to courts the choice of how
to do so. In any instance uniformity may or may not have decisive
importance in an interpretation. Given the unstructured array of
interpretive methods, it is unclear whether the uniformity mandate
tends to produce interpretations that harmonize transnational law.
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